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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the role and effects of the 
collateral framework which central banks, and 
in particular the Eurosystem, use in conducting 
temporary monetary policy operations. First, 
the paper explains the design of such a 
framework from the perspective of risk 
mitigation, which is the purpose of 
collateralisation. The paper argues that, by 
means of appropriate risk mitigation measures, 
the residual risk on any potentially eligible 
asset can be equalised and brought down to the 
level consistent with the risk tolerance of the 
central bank. Once this result has been achieved, 
eligibility decisions should be based on an 
economic cost-benefit analysis. Second, the 
paper looks at the effects of the collateral 
framework on financial markets, and in 
particular on spreads between eligible and 
ineligible assets. 5
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Central banks implement monetary policy by 
steering short-term market interest rates around 
a target level. They do this essentially by 
controlling the supply of liquidity, i.e. the 
deposits held by banks with the central bank, 
mostly by means of open market operations. 
Specifically, major central banks carry out open 
market operations in which liquidity is provided 
on a temporary basis. In the case of the 
Eurosystem, an amount of around €400 billion 
was provided in the last quarter of 2005, mostly 
through operations with a one-week maturity.
In theory, these temporary operations could 
take the form of short-term loans to banks, 
offered via a tender procedure. It is, however, 
one of the oldest and least disputed principles 
that a central bank should not, under any 
circumstances, provide unsecured credit to 
banks. This principle is enshrined, in the case of 
the Eurosystem, in Article 18.1 of the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and of 
the European Central Bank (hereafter referred 
to as the ESCB/ECB Statute), which prescribes 
that any Eurosystem credit operation needs to 
be “based on adequate collateral”. There are 
various reasons why central banks should not 
provide uncollateralised lending, namely:
–  Their function, and area of expertise, is to 
implement monetary policy to achieve price 
stability, not to be credit risk managers.
–  Access to central bank credit should be 
based on the principles of transparency and 
equal treatment. Unsecured lending is a 
risky art, requiring discretion, which is 
neither compatible with these principles nor 
with the accountability of the central bank.
– Central banks need to act quickly in 
monetary policy operations and, 
exceptionally, also in operations aiming at 
maintaining financial stability. Unsecured 
lending would require careful and time-
consuming analysis and limit setting.
–  They need to deal with a high number of 
banks, which can include banks with a rather 
low credit rating.1
–  They cannot establish credit lines reflecting 
the creditworthiness of different banks. A 
central bank can hardly stop transacting 
with a counterparty because its limit has 
been exhausted. Such an action may be 
interpreted as a sign of deterioration of 
that counterparty’s credit quality, resulting 
in its inability to get liquidity from the 
market, with potential financial stability 
consequences.
– To reflect the different degrees of 
counterparty risk in unsecured lending, 
banks charge different interest rates. By 
contrast, central banks have to apply uniform 
policy rates and thus cannot compensate the 
different degrees of risk.
The principle that all temporary operations 
supplying liquidity need to be secured with 
collateral implies that they have two legs: one 
in central bank deposits and one in collateral. 
While the cash leg obviously has a decisive 
influence on the market for deposits, it is less 
recognised that the collateral leg also has an 
influence on the market for the underlying 
asset. This effect is less strong, but it is 
surprising how little it has been researched, also 
considering that central banks face some 
important choices in the specification of their 
collateral framework. In addition to the 
description of their collateral framework in 
some technical documentation (see ECB (2005) 
for the case of the Eurosystem), there is to our 
knowledge only one comprehensive and 
analytical central bank study on collateral, 
namely the one by the Federal Reserve System 
(2002). Our paper aims to partially fill this gap, 
following the useful analyses of Fels (2005), 
1  Some central banks, including the US Federal Reserve System, 
conduct their open market operations only with a limited number 
of counterparties. However, all central banks, including the Fed, 
offer a borrowing facility under which they lend at a preset rate 
to a very wide range of banks. 
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Buiter and Sibert (2005) and Allen (2005). 
After discussing the Eurosystem collateral 
framework from the perspective of risk 
mitigation, the paper considers its effects on 
financial asset prices. The paper also clarifies 
some misunderstandings that emerged about 
the Eurosystem collateral framework. A 
systematic comparison of the Eurosystem 
collateral framework to equivalent such 
frameworks in other countries, including their 
effects on financial market spreads, goes beyond 
the scope of the present paper. Obviously, such 
a comparative analysis would be a very useful 
future research project.
The design of a central bank’s collateral 
framework may be summarised in five phases, 
which are also reflected in the organisation of 
this paper: 
–  First, a list of all asset types which could be 
eligible as collateral in central bank credit 
operations has to be established. These 
assets will have different risk characteristics, 
which implies that different risk mitigation 
measures are needed to deal with them. 
–  The specific aim of risk mitigation measures 
is to bring the risks that are associated with 
the different types of assets to the same 
level, namely the level that the central bank 
is ready to accept. Risk mitigation measures 
are costly and since they will have to be 
differentiated across asset types, the costs 
of these measures will also differ.2 The same 
applies to handling costs for different asset 
types: some types of collateral will be more 
costly to handle than others.
–  The potential collateral types should be 
ranked in increasing order of cost. 
–  The central bank has to choose a cut-off line 
in the ranking on the basis of a comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis, matching the demand 
for collateral with its increasing marginal 
costs.
–  Finally, the central bank has to monitor how 
the counterparties make use of the 
opportunities provided by the framework, in 
particular which collateral they use, and 
how much concentration risk occurs. The 
actual use by counterparties drives the 
residual credit risks taken by the central 
bank in a decisive way, while being very 
difficult to anticipate. If actual risks deviate 
much from base assumptions, there may be 
a need to revise the framework accordingly. 
The first two and the last step are discussed in 
Section 2. Steps three and four are presented in 
Section 3. Section 3 also discusses, in the 
framework of a simple model, the effect of 
eligibility decisions on spreads between fixed 
income securities. Section 4 concludes. An 
annex looks at one important specific issue in 
the design of the collateral framework, namely 
whether to segregate central bank policy 
operations across asset classes, or whether to 
allow for the pooling of different types of 
collateral in one collateralized operation. 
2 THE  COLLATERAL  FRAMEWORK  AND 
EFFICIENT RISK MITIGATION
This section discusses how the collateral 
framework can ensure the desired level of credit 
risk protection for the central bank. Any central 
bank, like any commercial bank operating in 
the secured interbank market, has to specify its 
collateral and risk mitigation framework. 
Central banks have somewhat more room to 
2  The fact that adequate risk mitigation measures can reduce risks 
of losses to a very low level is illustrated by the experience of 
the Deutsche Reichsbank between 1873 and 1900 with bills of 
exchange, which were by far the predominant asset type accepted 
by it. Although bills of exchange are relatively risky assets, 
losses relating to non-performing bills were insignificant. 
Around 0.01% of the value of bills was not paid immediately at 
maturity by the liable parties, and only 0.003% was actually 
never paid (Reichsbank (1910), pp. 152-64). The finding that 
risk mitigation measures can reduce residual risks for bills of 
exchange to a very low level is, of course, not sufficient to 
conclude that such bills should be made eligible. This would 
require the risk mitigation measures and the general handling 
of such a type of collateral to be cost-effective, as demonstrated 
in a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, as discussed in 
Section 3.7
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impose their preferred specifications, while 
commercial banks have to follow market 
conventions to a larger extent. Sub-section 2.1 
discusses the desirable characteristics of eligible 
collateral, Sub-section 2.2 looks at risk 
mitigation techniques, the specification of 
which needs to be different from asset type to 
asset type, while Sub-section 2.3 stresses that 
the actual functioning of the collateral 
framework has to be checked against 
expectations. 
2.1  DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF ELIGIBLE 
COLLATERAL
There are a number of properties that assets 
should have to be suitable as central bank 
collateral. Some, but not all, relate to the risks 
associated with the asset. 
(i)  Legal certainty
  There should be legal certainty about the 
transfer of the collateral to the central bank 
and the central bank’s ability to liquidate 
the assets in case of a counterparty default. 
Any legal doubts should be removed before 
an asset is accepted as eligible. 
(ii)  Credit quality and easy availability of 
credit assessment
  To minimise potential losses, the 
probability of a joint default of the 
counterparty and the collateral issuer 
should be extremely limited. For this, both 
a very small probability of default of the 
collateral issuer and a limited correlation 
of default between the collateral issuer and 
the counterparty are important. Ensuring a 
limited probability of default requires a 
credit assessment. For most marketable 
assets, a credit assessment is publicly 
available from rating agencies. For others 
(e.g. bank loans to corporations), the 
central bank may have to undertake its own 
credit assessment, or require the 
counterparty to obtain such an assessment 
from a third party, which is costly. To limit 
the correlation of default between the 
counterparty and the collateral issuer, 
central banks (and banks in the interbank 
market) normally forbid “close links” 
between the counterparty and the collateral 
issuer. The ECB assumes “close links” 
exist when the counterparty (issuer) owns 
at least 20% of the capital of the issuer 
(counterparty), or when a third party owns 
the majority of the capital of both the 
issuer and the counterparty (see ECB 
(2005), p. 42, footnote 14).
  With regard to credit quality, central banks 
typically set a minimum credit quality 
threshold. In the case of the ECB, this has 
been set to an A- rating by at least one of 
the three international rating agencies for 
rated issuers, and a corresponding 10 basis 
point probability of default for other 
issuers. The setting of a minimum rating is 
also standard in the interbank use of 
collateral, and in particular in triparty repo 
arrangements, in which systematic 
eligibility criteria need to be defined. The 
need to define a rating threshold is 
particularly acute in the case of the ECB, 
which accepts bonds from a plurality of 
governments and also a wide variety of 
private paper. Obviously, a trade-off exists 
between the credit quality threshold and 
the amount of collateral available. 
(iii) Easy pricing and liquidity
  Preferably, the asset should be easy to 
price and liquid so that, in case of 
counterparty default, it can be sold off 
quickly at prevailing prices. 
(iv)  Handling costs
  Handling costs should be limited: while 
some collateral, such as standard bonds, 
can be easily transferred through an 
efficient securities settlement system, 
other types of collateral may require 
manual handling or the setting-up of 
specific IT applications.3 
3  According to the Federal Reserve System (2002, pp. 3-80): 
“Securities (now most commonly in book-entry form) are very 
cost effective to manage as collateral; loans are more costly to 
manage because they are non-marketable.”
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(v)  Available amounts and prospective use
  The amounts available of an asset type and 
the asset’s actual (or prospective) use as 
collateral are important to determine 
whether it is worth investing the resources 
required for its inclusion in the list of 
collateral (in terms of acquiring the needed 
expertise, financial and legal analysis, 
data collection, setting up/adapting IT 
systems, maintenance, etc.). 
The asset class which ranks highest on the basis 
of these criteria is normally central government 
debt: it has a credit rating and generally a 
relatively high credit quality and is highly 
liquid, easily handled and massively available. 
Also rather attractive are rated, marketable, 
private debt instruments, in particular if they 
have a standard structure and are abundantly 
available. In the euro area, Pfandbriefe and 
other bullet bonds of banks, as well as local 
government debt and corporate bonds, have 
these characteristics. Asset-backed securities 
(ABSs) or collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) also normally have ratings, but tend to 
have special characteristics and are often less 
liquid. Non-marketable assets, such as bills of 
exchange or bank loans, rarely have credit 
ratings and may have higher handling costs. 
Finally, commodities or real estate could also 
be considered as eligible collateral, as they 
were in the past (see e.g. Reichsbank (1910)). 
However, the handling costs of such assets tend 
to be very high and there is, to the authors’ 
knowledge, no industrial country’s central bank 
that currently accepts them.
2.2 RISK  MITIGATION  TECHNIQUES
Different potential collateral types imply, before 
the application of risk mitigation measures, 
differing degrees of risk for the central bank. 
For instance, a credit operation is, everything 
else equal, riskier if the counterparty submits as 
collateral an illiquid ABS, relative to the case 
of a government security. In case of counterparty 
default, it will be more likely that the central 
bank will realise a loss when liquidating the 
ABS, relative to the government paper. 
The central bank cannot protect itself 100% 
from risks: some extremely unlikely events may 
lead to a loss (e.g. in case of sudden simultaneous 
defaults of both the counterparty and the issuer). 
While it is not easy to derive, in the framework 
of a stochastic general equilibrium model, the 
optimal risk tolerance of the central bank, this 
should in practice be clearly defined, and then 
be reached through adequate risk mitigation 
measures. Since the risk associated with 
collateralised operations before the application 
of credit risk mitigation measures depends on 
the type of collateral used, the risk mitigation 
measures will need to be differentiated according 
to the collateral type to ensure compliance with 
the defined risk tolerance of the central bank.
The following risk mitigation measures are 
typically used by central banks.
–  Valuation and margin calls: collateral needs 
to be valued accurately to ensure that the 
value of the liquidity provided to the 
counterparty does not exceed the collateral 
value. As asset prices fluctuate over time, 
collateral needs to be revalued regularly, 
and new collateral needs to be called in 
whenever a certain trigger level is reached. 
In a world without monitoring and 
handling costs, collateral valuation could be 
done on a real-time basis, and the trigger 
level for margin calls would be zero. In 
practice, these costs create a trade-off. The 
Eurosystem, in line with market practice, 
values collateral daily and has set a trigger 
level of 0.5%, i.e. when the collateral value, 
after haircuts (see below), falls below 99.5% 
of the cash leg, a margin call is triggered.
–  Haircuts: in case of counterparty default, 
the collateral needs to be sold. This takes 
some time and, for less liquid markets, a 
sale in the shortest possible time may have 
a negative impact on prices. To ensure that 
there are no losses at liquidation, a certain 
percentage of the collateral value needs to 
be deducted when accepting the collateral. 
This percentage depends on the price 
volatility of the relevant asset class and on 9
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the prospective liquidation time. The higher 
the haircuts, the better the protection, but 
the higher also the collateral needed for a 
given amount of liquidity. This trade-off 
needs to be addressed by setting a certain 
confidence level against losses. The 
Eurosystem, for instance, sets haircuts to 
cover 99% of price changes within the 
assumed orderly liquidation time of the 
respective asset class. Table 1 summarises 
the Eurosystem haircuts for marketable tier 
one assets. Haircuts increase with maturity, 
because so does the volatility of asset prices. 
In addition, haircuts increase as liquidity 
decreases, when moving from category I to 
category IV , because the estimated time 
needed for orderly liquidation increases. 
–  Limits: to avoid concentration, a central 
bank can impose limits on the use of 
collateral from certain issuers or on the use 
of certain types of collateral. As the setting-
up of a limit framework for collateral and 
the monitoring of compliance are normally 
rather costly, it is often preferable to set the 
other parameters of the framework to avoid 
the need for limits. This is what the 
Eurosystem has done.
One issue that has been discussed is whether 
haircuts should also be set to address different 
degrees of credit risk, inter alia to avoid that 
the Eurosystem’s collateral framework biases 
downwards spreads between euro area 
government issuers of different credit quality. 
Table 1 Eurosystem haircuts for marketable tier one assets
(percentages)
 Liquidity  categories
  Category I (central   Category II (local and   Category III (traditional 
  government debt,    regional government debt,   Pfandbriefe, bank debt,   Category IV 
Maturity  central bank debt)  Jumbo Pfandbriefe, etc.)  corporate debt)  (ABSs)
0-1 year  0.5  1  1.5  2
1-3 years  1.5  2.5  3  3.5
3-5 years  2.5  3.5  4.5  5.5
5-7 years  3  4.5  5.5  6.5
7-10 years  4  5.5  6.5  8
>10 years  5.5  7.5  9  12
Source: ECB (2005, pp. 46-7).
The first author to argue so was Joachim Fels of 
Morgan Stanley in a Financial Times article 
dated 1 April 2005:
“In its weekly refinancing operations, the system 
of European central banks treats the bonds of all 
member countries as equal when accepting them 
as collateral. Banks therefore have no incentive 
to discriminate between the bonds of issuers 
with different credit ratings, because banks can 
always ship bonds of lesser credit quality to the 
ECB to obtain liquidity. Thus, through its own 
actions, the ECB contributes to fiscal profligacy 
by preventing markets from fulfilling surveillance 
and signalling functions. […] The ECB should 
consider discriminating between issuers based 
on countries’ credit ratings when accepting 
collateral at the weekly refinancing operations. 
For issuers with a lesser credit quality, it could 
apply a haircut when accepting these bonds as 
collateral. Thus, banks participating in the 
refinancing operations would have a new 
incentive to price relative credit risks more 
adequately, and it would send a powerful signal 
to both markets and governments. Together, the 
markets and the ECB could become powerful 
allies in the surveillance of eurozone fiscal 
policies.”
Fels’ criticism was made before a clarification 
by the ECB that it has a rating threshold for 
accepting collateral in its operations4 and thus 
may have been based on a lack of information. 
4  Such a rating threshold could however be derived from the 
public list of eligible collateral.
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In any case, the practical proposal he puts 
forward, namely to apply credit-based haircuts, 
has a basic weakness, i.e. that such haircuts 
would be rather low, especially for government 
securities, if derived from risk management 
calculus, as shown below, and would, instead, 
be purely discretionary ad hoc measures, if set 
at higher levels. The latter course of action 
would inappropriately mix central bank risk 
management with fiscal policy and would also 
be inconsistent with a collateral framework 
based on objective grounds and reasoning. 
Furthermore, the empirical relevance of Fels’ 
criticism is not so clear, given the indications 
about the size of the eligibility premium 
reported in section 3.2. Given that the eligibility 
premium may be estimated at a few basis points 
and that additional haircuts would have 
proportional effects on spreads, even a 10% 
credit risk haircut (which is well beyond what 
can be justified from a risk perspective) would 
imply less than a one basis point effect on 
spreads, which is, from every point of view, 
insignificant. While arguing along similar lines, 
Buiter and Sibert (2005) and Allen (2005) 
extend the argumentation of Fels with some 
more modeling and further-reaching proposals. 
We discuss these arguments in more detail at 
the end of this section.
On the basis of its methodology for deriving 
haircuts, the Eurosystem, like a number of other 
central banks, has opted not to apply haircuts 
to protect against credit risk while addressing 
it by setting a minimum credit quality threshold. 
This choice is supported by the following 
simple credit Value-at-Risk (VaR) calculus. To 
ensure consistency, a credit risk haircut would 
have to be derived in the same manner as 
liquidity risk haircuts, namely, in the case of the 
Eurosystem, it would have to be set at the 99% 
confidence level for the losses arising at the 
relevant liquidation horizon. For euro area 
government bonds, this liquidation horizon has, 
conservatively, been assumed to be one week. It 
is therefore necessary to look for the 99% 
confidence level credit loss to be expected at a 
one-week horizon.
Credit VaR can be calculated in two modes: 
default mode and transition (or migration) 
mode.5 In default mode, only the default of the 
issuer is considered. Much more frequent, 
however, are credit losses that result from rating 
downgrades. Since rating changes are issuer-
specific, the associated bond price changes are 
classified as credit risk (and not as spread risk, 
which is the risk associated with a general 
change of spreads, e.g. of A rated corporate 
bonds relative to AAA rated ones). If risks 
resulting from rating migrations are included in 
the calculation of potential credit losses, one 
speaks of credit risk under migration mode.6 
Table 2 One-year transition probabilities of investment-grade bonds and five-year credit 
spreads 1)
(percentages)
   Probability of    Probability of   Probability of   Probability of 
  transition from AAA  transition from AA  transition from A  transition from BBB  5-year spreads
AAA  90.81 0.70 0.09 0.02  -0.07
AA  8.33  90.65 2.27 0.33 0.26
A 0.68  7.79  91.05  5.95  0.80
BBB  0.06 0.64 5.52  86.93 1.13
BB  0.12 0.06 0.74 5.30 3.64
B  0.00 0.14 0.26 1.17 5.04
CCC  0.00 0.02 0.01 0.12 8.89
Default  0.00 0.00 0.06 0.18   
Note: The credit spreads are calculated with respect to the swap curve.
1) The transition matrix (from Standard & Poor’s) and the term structure of swap spreads, are provided by CreditMetrics (1997, 
p. 25).
5  For a general introduction to these methods, see Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision (1999).
6  See S. Ramaswamy (2004). 11
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Credit loss distributions resulting from possible 
downgrades and default are typically obtained 
from historical transition matrices and some 
measure of credit spreads. Such data are 
contained in Table 2.
Still, two issues arise when calculating a one-
week 99% credit VaR. First, we smoothen the 
credit loss distribution by calculating the 
variance of the loss distribution and then 
imposing the normality assumption. Second, 
migration matrices refer to a one-year horizon, 
while we have to deal with a one-week 
liquidation horizon. In line with the 
CreditMetrics model, we simply divide the one-
year transition and default probabilities by 52.7 
It should however be noted that this reflects a 
conservative approach. To see why, assume a 
basic structural credit risk model in which the 
changes of the value of the firm’s net assets, x, 
follow a Brownian motion, and in which default 
occurs when this net value is zero. Assume that 
x is N(x0,1) over the one-year horizon. Assume 
that the one year PD (or downwards migration 
probability) would be a. This allows us to 
determine x0 from the other assumptions:
 ) ( ) 0 (
1
0 0 D D
 )        )    x x x P
We are looking for the one week PD u, knowing 
that over a one week horizon, the net asset value 
is N(x0,1/52), since the asset value follows a 
Brownian motion. We thus have:
M    ) ) 52 ( 0 x
By substituting x0 from above, we obtain:8
) 52 ) ( (
1 D M
 ) )  
This is an extremely small number, much 
smaller than a/52. By simply dividing the one 
year probability of default by 52, we actually 
overestimate the one week probability of 
default, according to the simple model above, 
by e.g. an incredible factor of 10152 for a one 
basis point one year PD, and still by a factor of 
1059 for a one percent one year probability of 
default. There may, of course, be good reasons 
to argue why this simplistic structural approach 
is not adequate to scale down probabilities of 
default at shorter horizons (fat tails in the 
7  See e.g. CreditMetrics (1997).
8  This is actually a slight simplification as it ignores the possibility 
that the net asset value gets negative, and triggers default, 
before the end of the respective horizon, while no linger being 
negative at the end of the horizon. This can be taken into account 
rather easily by applying the reflection principle for Brownian 
Motion (see e.g. Doob, 1953).
9  Let PD be the issuer default probability and R the recovery rate. A 
credit VaR at 99% confidence level could be calculated as follow: 
  PD PD R CreditVaR   u   1 1 33 . 2 % 99 . See also Ramaswamy (2004).
10  The expected loss is calculated as follows:  ij ij
j
i P PL Eloss ¦   , Pij 
  being the probability of transition from the initial credit rating 
i to the credit rating j. The credit VaR at 99% confidence level 
corresponds to a scaling of the unexpected loss by a factor of 
2.33: 
2
% 99 33 . 2 i ij ij
j
Eloss PL P CreditVaR    ¦
innovations to asset price, jump-diffusion 
processes, bundled revelation of new 
information, etc.), but the argument above in 
any case highlights the large uncertainties in 
establishing short-term PDs, and that, with our 
approach to subdivide simply the one year PD 
by 52, we clearly are on the conservative side.
The calculation of a credit VaR in default mode 
requires the probability of default of the issuer 
and the recovery rate of the asset. The standard 
deviation to be used in the calculation of the 
credit VaR under the normality assumption is 
calculated as the standard deviation of a 
binomial distribution.9
In transition mode, the required inputs are the 
transition probabilities of the issuer for the 
different ratings, as shown in Table 2, the price 
and the modified duration of the bond, a term 
structure of credit spreads and lastly the 
recovery rate. The percentage loss or gain PLij 
from transition from the initial credit rating i to 
the credit rating j can be approximated by the 
following formula: PLij = modified duration * 
(spreadi – spreadj),  spreadi being the credit 
spread of the initial rating and spreadj the credit 
spread of the new rating. For transition to the 
default state, the loss corresponds to (1 – R), R 
being the recovery rate. In this case also, first 
the standard deviation of the loss distribution is 
calculated and is then used to calculate a credit 
VaR under the “normal” assumption.10 
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Using the transition probabilities and the five-
year credit spreads from Table 2, and the 
assumption of a 50% recovery rate in case of 
default, we obtain the credit VaR figures in 
Table 3.
Both transition and default mode CreditVaRs 
increase as the rating deteriorates and, as 
expected, the transition-mode VaR is consistently 
larger. Still, even the transition-mode VaR 
seems to remain, at least down to the single A 
rating level, so low that the added precision 
obtained from including credit risk-related 
haircuts in the framework would not really 
justify the increased complexity, which would 
result in the haircut matrix, reported in Table 1, 
needing a third dimension for ratings. The credit 
VaR would obviously be larger if the liquidation 
horizon was longer than one week, the latter 
being the ECB liquidation horizon assumed for 
the most liquid assets, such as government 
bonds. The conclusion reached above therefore 
needs to be qualified for assets with lower 
liquidity. The following table displays transition 
mode CreditVaR figures for five-year bonds for 
each of the four liquidity categories of the 
Eurosystem framework (i.e. assuming a one, 
Table 3 One-week 99% credit VaR for 
different rating levels, for liquidity 
category I
(percentages)
Rating Transition-mode    Default-mode
  credit VaR   credit VaR
AAA 0.29  0.00
AA 0.46  0.00
A 0.70  0.40
BBB 1.42  0.69
Table 4 99% credit VaR for different rating levels and liquidity classes, for five year fixed 
coupon bond
(percentages)
  Liquidity category I   Liquidity category II  Liquidity category III  Liquidity category IV
Rating  (1 week liquid. period)   (2 week liquid. period)   (3 week liquid. period)   (4 week liquid. period)
AAA  0.29 0.41 0.50 0.57
AA  0.46 0.65 0.80 0.92
A  0.70 0.99 1.21 1.39
BBB  1.42 2.01 2.46 2.84
Liquidity haircut 3 4.5 5.5 6.5
two, three, and four weeks liquidation time, and 
correspondingly scaling up linearly the one 
year probabilities of migration and default). 
Scaling probabilities of default linearly over 
time, means (approximately) scaling CreditVaR 
according to the square root of time.   
The last row of Table 4, containing the liquidity 
risk related haircuts of a 5-7 year maturity fixed 
coupon bond, is repeated from Table 2 and 
presented again for comparison purposes.11 
Since both the CreditVaR and the liquidity risk 
related haircut are scaled up using 
(approximately) the square root of time, the 
ratio of the two theoretical haircuts is 
independent of the liquidity category, and, as it 
can be seen from the table, the liquidity risk 
related haircut is more than four times higher 
than the credit risk related one – for a “single-
A” rated instrument. Thus, the conclusion 
reached above, that it is probably not worthwhile 
to add one dimension to the haircut matrix, is 
confirmed for all four liquidity categories.
A final issue worth studying further is the 
correlation of liquidity and credit risk, and the 
effect this would have on appropriate haircuts. 
It is clear that in crisis situations, both interest 
rate volatility and the likelihood of credit risk 
materializing will be exceptionally high, and 
thus there will be more correlation in the tails 
than under usual circumstances (i.e. a Gaussian 
copula will not be adequate). As the challenges 
to model the correlation of credit and interest 
11  It should be recalled that for the calculation of CreditVaR, we 
used a five years modified duration, while the liquidity risk 
related haircuts reflect a 5-7 year residual maturity, which fits 
well. 13
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rate risk in the tails of distributions are however 
substantial both in theoretical and empirical 
terms (the latter due to a scarcity of data), it is 
concluded that such an analysis would go 
beyond the present paper.12
After this brief analysis, we can discuss in the 
following in slightly more detail some criticisms 
of Buiter and Sibert (2005), following Fels 
(2005), of the Eurosystem collateral policy.
The first, general problem with the line of 
argumentation of Buiter and Sibert is that they 
do not derive haircuts from solid risk 
management calculus. The ECB has explained 
its approach to risk mitigation in e.g. ECB 
(2004), namely that haircuts on marketable debt 
instruments are derived on the basis of a 99% 
VaR for price changes within the assumed 
period in which orderly liquidation can take 
place after a counterparty default.13 Haircuts 
should thus depend on the assumed liquidation 
time and on the volatility of the asset prices. It 
is obvious that asset price volatility increases 
with the maturity of the assets. This is why the 
ECB, like the Fed and the Bank of Japan, has 
established haircuts that increase with the 
maturity of the assets. By contrast, Buiter and 
Sibert’s desire to make haircuts dependent on 
credit risk is not really supported by the analysis 
above: credit risk haircuts derived on the basis 
of risk management calculus would be relatively 
low for the relevant range of eligible assets, in 
particular for liquid government securities, 
which are the focus of attention of the two 
authors. 
Unlike the practices of the Eurosystem and 
other central banks, haircuts in market 
operations do not systematically depend on 
maturity. The difference between the central 
banks’ approach and market conventions can be 
justified on the basis of two specific features of 
central banks. First, central banks apply the 
same policy rates to all counterparties. 
Therefore, a higher residual risk in a repo 
operation, due to imperfect haircuts, cannot be 
compensated, as in the case of commercial 
banks, by a higher interest rate. Second, central 
12  See Bindseil and Nyholm (2006) for a joint modelling of market 
and credit risk.
13 The total liquidation time is based on three components: a 
valuation period, a grace period and a realisation time. The 
valuation period, which is one day (reflecting daily valuation), 
and the grace period, which is assumed to be three to four days, 
are again common to all liquidity categories. By contrast, the 
realisation time required for an orderly sale of the assets is 
assumed to grow as liquidity decreases.
14 All figures for available and deposited collateral are annual 
averages. For 2005, the average is calculated over the first three 
quarters only.
banks nearly always deal with a wide range of 
counterparties, without any possibility to 
impose credit caps, so there is more of a need 
to be very precise and systematic in haircut 
methodology. By contrast, banks have discretion 
when deciding with whom and for what amounts 
to deal and can thus manage the higher risks 
resulting from a simple haircut formula.
The second objection to Buiter and Siebert is 
that their criticism tends to disregard the 
methodology, explained e.g. in ECB (2004), for 
deriving risk mitigation methods. 
The authors tend to focus exclusively on 
government bonds and ignore the most striking 
feature of the Eurosystem collateral framework, 
consisting in the high use of private debt 
instruments. Figures on the availability and use 
of collateral were first published by the ECB in 
its Monthly Bulletin in April 2001 (the article 
entitled “The collateral framework of the 
Eurosystem”, pp. 49-62). Further information 
on this subject is provided in ECB (2006a), 
(2006b). As reported there, in 2005 the total 
outstanding amount of available collateral was 
approximately €8.2 trillion14 (see Chart 1), of 
which 54% (or €4.4 trillion) was EU Member 
States’ general government debt. Government 
debt of the four euro area countries which do 
not have an AAA rating from any of the three 
international rating agencies (Belgium, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal) accounted for 21% of total 
collateral, or 39% of the pool of government 
debt. Most of the remaining 46% of the total 
collateral pool consisted of the debt of private-
sector issuers: covered and uncovered bank 
bonds (30%), corporate bonds (8%) and asset-
backed securities (5%). Other issuers, such as 
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supranational organisations, made up the 
remaining 4%.
The amount of collateral deposited for possible 
use in the Eurosystem’s credit operations during 
2005 was on average €853 billion, approximately 
10% of the total amount of eligible collateral. 
Government bonds accounted for 34% of the 
collateral used (Chart 1). Using the percentage 
share of government bonds in the total pool of 
eligible collateral as a benchmark, government 
bonds are under-represented by 20 percentage 
points. The bonds of the four lower-rated 
governments, which represented 21% of the 
total pool of available collateral, account for 
only 13% of the total collateral used and are 
therefore also under-represented. In contrast, 
covered and non-covered bank bonds were used 
more than proportionally, relative to their share 
in the eligible assets. The more extensive use of 
bank bonds has nothing to do with lower credit 
quality, as the large majority of Pfandbriefe, 
which make up the largest share of bank bonds, 
are AAA rated.15 Instead, this higher use is 
related to the fact that outstanding volumes 
and liquidity of bank bonds tend to be lower 
compared with government debt. The same kind 
of phenomenon appears, albeit in different size, 
for asset-backed securities. In any case, this 
underlines that the above-mentioned authors’ 
focus on bonds issued by different governments 
is too narrow and that the more relevant 
phenomenon of over-proportional use is between 
government bonds on one side and bank bonds 
and asset-backed securities on the other side. 
2.3 MONITORING  THE  COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK 
However thorough the work underlying a 
collateral framework is, the actual use of 
collateral and the resulting concentration of 
risks16 cannot be fully anticipated. The same 
framework may lead in one country to a much 
higher level of risk than in another, since the 
availability of collateral and its distribution 
may differ. The central bank, therefore, should 
15  See e.g. Verband Deutscher Hypothekenbanken (2004, pp. 10-
11).
16  E.g. do single counterparties tend to provide collateral with very 
correlated risks, in the extreme case only from one issuer? Is 
there a tendency of banks in general to make over-proportional 
use of certain types of collateral? 






















































1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Use of marketable collateral
1) Covered and uncovered bank bonds were not distinguished until 2004, and were called “credit institution”.15
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monitor the actual use of collateral, not only on 
aggregate, but also as much as possible on a 
bank-by-bank basis, to determine whether an 
adjustment of the framework may be needed. 
This remark is supported by the consideration 
that an appropriate point in the simplicity/
precision trade-off must be chosen when 
building any actual framework. Indeed, to 
remain simple, transparent and efficient, a 
collateral framework has to accept a certain 
degree of approximation. For instance, the 
Eurosystem has defined, for the purpose of 
setting haircuts, four liquidity categories and 
has classified assets in these categories on the 
basis of institutional criteria, as shown in 
Table 1 (see ECB (2005), pp. 46-7). Obviously 
liquidity also differs within these categories as 
Table 5, which takes bid-ask spreads as an 
indicator of liquidity, shows. 
For instance, while government bonds are 
normally very liquid, euro-denominated 
government bonds of new EU Member States 
are less so. The Eurosystem’s classification of 
all government bonds under the most liquid 
category may thus be regarded as a considerable 
simplification. This is a case in which a central 
Table 5 Bid-ask spreads as an indicator of 
liquidity for selected assets
     Liquidity 
Rating Issuer  indicator 1)
AAA  Germany, France, the Netherlands 
  and Spain  0.5 to 1 cent
   Austria, Finland, Ireland  1 cent
   Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg  3 to 5 cents
   Agencies/supranationals and 
  Jumbo Pfandbriefe  3 to 5 cents
AA  Italy and Belgium  0.5 to 1 cent
   Portugal  1 cent
   Pfandbriefe  3 to 5 cents
   Other German Länder  3 to 5 cents
   Slovenia  20 cents
A Greece  1  cent
   A rated new EU Member States  15 to 20 cents
1) Bid-offer spreads observed on 5-year euro-denominated 
bonds in Trade Web (when available) in basis points of prices 
(so-called cents or ticks). Indicative averages for relatively 
small tickets (less than €10 million). Bid-offer spreads very 
much depend on the size of the issue and how old it is. The 
difference in bid-offer spreads between the various issuers tends 
to increase rapidly with the traded size.
bank needs to monitor whether its simplifications 
lead to a significant deviation of actual risks 
from the agreed risk tolerance. What matters in 
this case is that: (i) the average liquidity of each 
class is correctly estimated; (ii) the heterogeneity 
within each asset class is not too high; and (iii) 
the prevailing heterogeneity does not lead to 
severe distortions and concentration risk.17
3  A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE 
COLLATERAL FRAMEWORK
A central bank should aim at economic 
efficiency and base its decisions on a 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. In the 
case of the Eurosystem, this principle is 
enshrined in Article 2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, 
which states that “the ESCB shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition, favouring an 
efficient allocation of resources”.
The cost-benefit analysis can start from the 
condition, established in Section 2, that risk 
mitigation measures make the residual risk of 
each collateral type equal and consistent with 
the risk tolerance of the central bank. Based on 
this premise, the basic idea of an economic 
cost-benefit analysis is that all collateral types 
can be ranked in terms of the cost of their use. 
17  In this context, another mistaken criticism of the Eurosystem by 
Buiter and Sibert (2005) may be mentioned, which results from 
the confusion between credit and liquidity risk. Buiter and 
Sibert question the fact that government paper with different 
ratings is put into the same, highest liquidity class in the 
Eurosystem collateral. Correspondingly, they propose putting 
all triple A government paper in the first liquidity class, double 
A in the second liquidity class and so on. To see that liquidity 
risk and credit risk are, conceptually, two different things does 
not require much explanation: the first refers to the risk that 
either time or price concessions would be needed to sell, or for 
that matter to buy, a given asset; the second refers to the 
possibility that one issuer may default or, less dramatically, that 
it would be downgraded. Table 5 above shows, in addition, that 
the two are also different empirically. In fact, there is one A 
rated issuer (Greece) which is more liquid than some AAA rated 
issuers (e.g. the state of Bavaria or supranationals), there are 
some triple A issuers (Austria, Finland and Ireland) that are less 
liquid than some other triple A issuers (Germany, France, the 
Netherlands and Spain) and so on, which also confirms that, 
empirically, credit risk and liquidity risk are different things. 
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This cost will in turn depend on the five 
characteristics listed in Sub-section 2.1.
Somewhere on the cost schedule between the 
least and the most costly collateral types, the 
costs associated with additional collateral types 
will be equal to the declining marginal value of 
one more unit of collateral. Of course, estimating 
the “supply” and “demand” curves is 
challenging, and will probably rarely be done in 
practice. Still, such an approach establishes a 
logical framework to examine the eligibility 
decisions. The next sub-section provides an 
example of such a framework in the context of 
a simple model.18 
3.1  A SIMPLE MODEL 
The following model simplifies drastically in 
one dimension, namely by assuming 
homogeneity of banks, both in terms of needs 
for central bank refinancing and in terms of 
holdings of the different asset types. Even with 
this simplification, the estimation of the model 
appears difficult. Still, it illustrates certain 
considerations that might be ignored if eligibility 
decisions were not dealt with in a comprehensive 
model. For instance, if a central bank 
18 Consider briefly the potential implications of the collateral 
framework for monetary policy. After all, the purpose of 
collateralised operations is to implement monetary policy, so it 
is legitimate to ask whether the collateral framework does affect 
it. Actually, in the “real bills doctrine” and its numerous variants, 
it was argued that choosing the right type of assets is indeed 
essential for monetary stability. In its original sense, the real 
bills doctrine stated that banknotes, which are lent in exchange 
for “real bills”, that is, titles to real value or value in process of 
creation, cannot be issued in excess (see, for example, Green 
(1987)). The origin of the real bills doctrine lies in 18th-century 
England and possibly relates to the fact that usury laws prevented 
the Bank of England’s discount rate from being set above 5%. 
Therefore, when the appropriate Bank rate should have been 
higher, the Bank of England tried to limit the gold drain by 
restricting the set of eligible paper, for example to real bills, 
claiming that this type of paper had the specific property of 
representing real commerce. While already in 1802 Henry 
Thornton convincingly refuted the real bills doctrine, it was 
influential even until the 1990s. For instance, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank still required that “the trade bills purchased by the 
Bundesbank are those drawn between enterprises […] on the 
basis of deliveries of goods and services” (Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1995), p. 100). As it is obvious today that monetary policy 
implementation works via short-term interest rates, controlled 
through liquidity management, and thus does not depend on the 
type of collateral posted (or the type of assets purchased), this 
issue is not further investigated here.
underestimates the handling costs of a specific 
asset type, and thus overestimates ex ante the 
use of these assets by counterparties in central 
bank operations, then it may take a socially sub-
optimal decision to make them eligible.
A = {1…n}  Set of all asset types that may potentially be eligible as collateral. 
E ⊂ A  Set of eligible assets, as decided by the central bank. Ineligible assets are (A\E) (i.e. 
set A excluding set E).
Wj  Available amount of asset type j in the banking system which can be potentially used 
as collateral. This is, where relevant, after application of the relevant risk mitigation 
measures needed to achieve the desired low residual risk.
Vj  Amount of collateral of type j that is actually submitted to the central bank (again, 
after haircuts); obviously j ∈ E.
D  Refinancing needs of banking system vis-à-vis the central bank (“liquidity needs”). 
Exogenously given in our model.
Kj  Fixed cost component for central bank to include asset class j for one year in the list 
of eligible assets.
kjVj  Variable cost for central bank of handling collateral type j. The costs include the 
costs of risk mitigation measures.
cjVj  Variable cost for banks of handling collateral type j. Again, this includes all handling 
and assessment costs. If haircuts are high, obviously costs are increased proportionally. 
Moreover, this includes opportunity costs: for some collateral, there may be use in 
the interbank repo market, and the associated value is lost if the collateral is used 
for central bank refinancing. 17
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When deciding which collateral to make 
eligible, the central bank has first to take note 
of the banking system’s refinancing needs vis-





                                                    (1)
Inequality (1) is a precondition for a smooth 
monetary policy implementation. A failure of 
monetary policy implementation due to 
collateral scarcity would generate very high 
social costs. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that D is exogenous and fixed; in a more 
general model, it could be a stochastic variable 
and the constraint above would be transformed 
into a confidence level constraint. In addition, 
collateral provides utility as a buffer against 
interbank intraday and end-of-day liquidity 
shocks. We assume that one has to “use” the 
collateral to protect against liquidity shocks, 
i.e. one has to bear the related fixed and variable 
costs (one can imagine that the collateral has to 
be pre-deposited with the central bank). For the 
sake of simplicity, we also assume that, as long 
as sufficient collateral is available, liquidity-
absorbing shocks do not create costs. If however 
the bank runs out of collateral, costs arise.
We look at one representative bank, which 
is taken to represent the entire banking 
system, thus avoiding aggregation issues. Let   
¦

   
E j
j V D r be the collateral reserves of the
representative bank to address liquidity shocks. 
Let e be the liquidity shock with expected value 
0 and variance r2 and let F be a continuous 
cumulative density function and ƒ be a 
symmetric density function. The costs of a 
liquidity shortage are p per euro. Assume that 
the bank orders collateral according to variable 
costs in an optimal way, such that C(r) is the 
continuous, monotonously increasing and 
convex cost function for pre-depositing 
collateral for liquidity purposes. The 
risk-neutral representative bank will chose   




i W r  that minimises expected costs G of
collateral holdings and liquidity shocks: 
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The first-order condition of this problem is (see 
e.g. Freixas and Rochet (1997), p. 228):
0 ) ( /     w w r pF r C                                        (3)
The cost function  /w w r C  increases in steps as r 
grows, since the collateral is ordered from the 
cheapest to the most expensive. The function   
pF(–r) represents the gain from holding 
collateral, in terms of avoidance of costs 
deriving from insufficient liquidity, and is 
continuously decreasing in r, starting from 
p/2. 
While the first-order condition (3) reflects the 
optimum from the commercial bank’s point of 
view, it obviously does not reflect the optimum 
from a social point of view, as it does not include 
the costs borne by the central bank. If social 
costs of collateral use are C(r) + K(r), then the 
first-order condition describing the social 
optimum is simply:
0 ) ( / /     w w  w w r pF r K r C                          (4)
Consider now a simple numerical example that 
illustrates the decision-making problem of both 
the commercial and the central bank and its 
welfare effects. Note that we assume, in line 
with the actual central bank practice, that no 
fees are imposed on the banking system for the 
posting of collateral. Obviously, fees, like any 
price, play a key role in ensuring efficiency in 
the allocation of resources. 
In the example, we assume that liquidity shocks 
are normally distributed and have a standard 
deviation of €1,000 billion and that the cost of 
running out of collateral in case of a liquidity 
shock is five basis points in annualised terms. 
We also assume that the banking system has 
either a zero, a €1,500 billion or a €3,000 billion 
structural refinancing need towards the 
central bank. The first-order condition for the 
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representative bank (3) is illustrated in the 
following chart. The intersection between the 
bank’s marginal costs and benefits will 
determine the amount of collateral posted, 
provided the respective collateral type is 
eligible.
It can be seen from the chart that if D=0; 1,500 
or 3,000, the bank (the banking system) 
will post €1,280, 2,340 and 3,250 billion as 
collateral, respectively, moving from less to 
more costly collateral. In particular, where 
D=3,000, it will use collateral up to type e – 
provided this collateral and all the cheaper ones 
are eligible. 
Table 6 Example of parameters underlying a cost-benefit analysis of collateral eligibility
     Fixed costs   Variable costs   Variable costs
  Available amount  for central bank   for central bank     for banks 
Category (j)  (EUR millions) (W)  (EUR billions) (V)  (b.p. per year) (k)  (b.p. per year) (c)
a (e.g. government securities)  1,000,000  0  0.5  0.5
b (e.g. Pfandbriefe)  1,000,000  5  0.5  0.5
c 500,000  5  1  1
d 500,000  5  1  1
e (e.g. bank loans)  500,000  20  1  2
f (e.g. commodities)  500,000  50  10  5
Chart 2 Marginal costs and benefits for banks of posting collateral with the central bank
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How does the social optimality condition on 
eligibility (4) compare with that of the 
commercial bank (3)? First, the central bank 
should make assets eligible as collateral to 
respect constraint (1), e.g. when D=1,500 it 
needs to make eligible all category a and b 
assets. Beyond this, it should decide on 
eligibility on the basis of a social cost-benefit 
analysis. Considering (unlike the commercial 
bank that does not internalise the central bank 
costs) all costs and benefits, the following table 
provides, for the three cases, the total costs and 
benefits for society of various eligibility 
decisions.19
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Table 7 Social welfare under different sets of eligible collateral 
and refinancing needs of the banking system, excluding costs 
and benefits of the provision of collateral for refinancing needs 
(EUR billions) 
Eligible assets   D=0  D=1,500  D=3,000
a  30.2  Mon. pol. failure  Mon. pol. failure
a + b  42.8  45.0  Mon. pol. failure
a + b + c  37.8  15.2  Mon. pol. failure
a + b + c + d 32.8  10.2  0
a + b + c + d + e 12.8  -9.8  -40.0
a + b + c + d + e + f -37.2  -59.8  -89.0
The highest figure in each column, highlighted 
in bold, indicates the socially optimal set of 
eligible collateral. It is interesting that while in 
the first scenario (D=0) the social optimum 
allows the representative bank to post as much 
collateral as it wishes, taking into account its 
private benefits and costs, this is not the case in 
the second and third scenarios (D=1,500 and 
3,000 respectively). Here, the social optimum 
corresponds to a smaller set of collateral than 
the one that banks would prefer. The result is 
not surprising since the costs for the central 
bank enter into the social optimum but are 
ignored by the representative bank. Of course, 
the result also depends on the absence of fees, 
which could make social and private optima 
coincide. 
When interpreting this model, it should be 
borne in mind that it is simplistic and ignores 
various effects relevant in practice. Most 
importantly, the heterogeneity of banks in terms 
of collateral holdings, refinancing needs and 
vulnerability to liquidity shocks makes a big 
difference, also for the welfare analysis. As 
the marginal utility of collateral should fall 
not only at the level of the aggregate banking 
system – but also clearly for individual banks, 
the heterogeneity of banks implies that the 
actual total social value of collateral eligibility 
will be higher than in the model.19 Another 
notable simplification is the assumption that 
the value of the collateral’s liquidity service is 
constant over time. This will actually vary, and 
peak in the case of a financial crisis. This should 
be taken into account by the central bank when 
doing its cost-benefit analysis.
Various effects could be illustrated with other 
examples. For instance, there could be cases in 
which the central bank would not order the 
collateral classes in the same way as banks, 
because the social costs ranking would not 
coincide with the private costs ranking. 
It is interesting to consider, within the example 
provided, the effects of eligibility choices on 
the spreads between different assets. Let us 
concentrate on the case where refinancing needs 
are 1,500 and the central bank has chosen the 
socially optimal set of eligible collateral, which 
is a+b. The representative bank will use the full 
amount of available collateral (2,000) and there 
is a “rent”, i.e. marginal value of owning 
collateral of type a or b of around 1 basis point, 
equal to the marginal value for this amount 
minus the marginal cost (the gross marginal 
value being pF (r/r) =1.5, for p = 5 basis points, 
r = 2,000 – D = 500 and r = 1,000). Therefore, 
assuming that the ineligible asset c would be 
equal in every other respect to a and b, it should 
trade at a yield of 1 basis point above these 
assets. Now assume that the central bank 
deviates from the social optimum and also 
makes c eligible. The representative bank will 
increase its use of collateral to its private 
optimum of 2,340 and the marginal rent 
disappears, as marginal cost and marginal 
benefit are equalised for that amount. At the 
same time, the equilibrium spread between c 
and a/b is now only 0.5 basis point, since this 
is the difference in the cost of using these assets 
as collateral. What now are the spreads of these 
three assets relative to asset d? Before making 
c eligible, these were -1, -1 and 0 for a, b and 
c, respectively. After making c eligible, these 
are -0.5, -0.5 and 0, respectively, i.e. the spread 
between c and d remains zero, and the spread 
between a/b and d has narrowed down to the 
cost difference between the different assets. 
19  This is because if the utility of having collateral is for all banks 
a falling and convex function, then the average utility of 
collateral across heterogeneous banks is always higher than the 
utility of the average collateral holdings of banks (a bit like 
Jensen’s inequality for concave utility functions). One could aim 
at numerically getting some idea of the difference this makes, 
depending on assumptions that would somehow reflect anecdotal 
evidence, but this would go beyond the scope of this paper.
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The increased “supply of eligibility” from the 
central bank reduces the “rent” given by the 
eligibility premium. This shows how careful 
one has to be when making general statements 
about a constant eligibility premium. 
Within this example, further cases may be 
examined. If, for D=1,500, in addition to a, b 
and c, d is also made eligible, which represents 
a further deviation from the social optimum due 
to the implied fixed costs for society, nothing 
changes in terms of spreads, and the amount of 
collateral used does not change either. The same 
obviously holds when asset classes e and n are 
added. 
In the case D=3,000, the social optimum is, 
following Table 7, to make assets a, b, c and d 
eligible. Very similar effects to the previous 
case can be observed. The rent for banks of 
having collateral of types a and b is now two 
basis points, and the rent of owning collateral 
of types c and d is, due to the higher costs, 1.5 
basis points. Therefore, the spread between the 
two groups of assets is again 0.5 basis point. 
The spread between assets of type a or b and 
the ineligible assets of types e and f is 2 basis 
points. After making e eligible, the spreads 
between e and all other eligible asset classes do 
not change (because at the margin, having e is 
still without special value). However, due to the 
increased availability of collateral, the spreads 
against asset category f shrink by 0.5 basis 
point. 
Finally, an alternative interpretation of the 
model, in which the variable costs of using the 
assets as collateral also include opportunity 
cost, is of interest and could be elaborated upon 
further in future research. Indeed, it could be 
argued that financial assets can, to a varying 
extent, be used as collateral in interbank 
operations, as an alternative to the use in central 
bank operations. Using assets as central bank 
collateral thus creates opportunity costs, which 
are high for e.g. government bonds, and low for 
less liquid assets, such as ABSs and bank loans, 
as these are not used as collateral in interbank 
markets. Therefore, the order in which banks 
would rank eligible assets according to their 
overall costs could be different from a ranking 
based only on handling and credit assessment 
costs, as implied above. According to this 
different ranking, for instance, bank loans may 
be “cheaper” for banks to use than government 
bonds. While this underlines that the model 
above is a considerable simplification and 
should be considered only as a first conceptual 
step towards a comprehensive theoretical 
framework, it also shows that the model can be 
extended to encompass different assumptions. 
3.2   EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF 
ELIGIBILITY ON YIELDS 
In the previous section, a simple model was 
described to provide a framework for the 
decision of the central bank to make different 
types of asset eligible and to look at the interest 
rate differential between eligible and ineligible 
assets, dubbed the “eligibility premium”. In 
this section, we seek empirical indications of 
the possible size of this premium. 
Before proceeding, we would like to highlight 
that we would not consider the eligibility 
premium as implying a “distortion” of financial 
markets, as some commentators have assumed. 
The central bank is a large and idiosyncratic 
player20 in the money market. It is not surprising 
that a single, large and idiosyncratic player will 
have an impact on the economic equilibrium in 
a market, and a priori, this does not imply a 
distortion relative to some social optimum. The 
analysis in the previous section, on the contrary, 
was presenting a normative theory for a central 
bank’s compilation of the list of eligible assets, 
which by definition aimed at a social optimum, 
without meaning that there would be no impact 
on spreads. In the model, a distortion was only 
occurring in so far as not all social costs of the 
use of collateral (namely the costs occurring to 
the central bank) were taken into account, such 
that banks would slightly overuse collateral. 
20 The idiosyncracy arises for instance from the fact that the 
central bank, as not being threatened by illiquidity, can probably 
assign a different cost to a lack of liquidity of collateral, as 
compared to normal market players.21
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 49
August 2006
This is, however, an issue on its own, and can in 
any case be repaired, if really relevant in 
practice, by imposing a fee. In sum, we would 
conclude that it is not appropriate to generally 
identify the effect of eligibility decisions by the 
central bank as a “distortion”. 
As argued above, eligibility as central bank 
collateral should make, everything else being 
equal, the asset more attractive and thus increase 
its price and lower its yield.21 The additional 
attractiveness results from the fact that the asset 
can provide a liquidity service, which has a 
positive value. While the value of liquidity can 
in principle be modelled easily in the style of 
the preceding section, it is very difficult to 
estimate the yield effect of declaring a specific 
security eligible for central bank operations. 
There are basically two reasons for this. First, 
with temporary operations, the price and credit 
risk of an asset remains with the bank putting it 
forward. This means that, in a portfolio model, 
the effect of temporary operations on the price 
of the involved assets is small. So, we know a 
priori that we are looking for a small variable, 
which presents a challenging test for any 
empirical approach, in particular if the variable 
in question correlates with other variables with 
a stronger impact, such as the credit rating. 
Second, the eligibility premium depends on 
conditions which change over time. As was seen 
in the model presented above, the first time-
varying condition is the overall scarcity of 
collateral: if the banking system has a liquidity 
surplus and the need for collateral for payment 
system operations is limited, or if there is ample 
government debt outstanding, then declaring an 
additional asset eligible will have no measurable 
effect on prices, as it would anyway not be used 
to a significant extent. If, by contrast, the need 
for central bank collateral is high, and the 
amounts of eligible collateral are limited, then 
the price effects of declaring one asset type 
eligible will be substantial. Similarly, the 
relative amount of the collateral assets newly 
made eligible also matters, as it also changes 
the overall availability of collateral and therefore 
its value. Thus, the price of the eligible asset A 
should be affected more strongly by the decision 
to make asset B eligible, if asset B is in abundant 
supply. Moreover, the eligibility premium will 
change in case of financial tensions, shifting 
the demand curve for collateral to the right.
Of course, also the price elasticity of demand of 
those investors who are not interested in the 
collateral feature of the asset is also relevant. If 
this elasticity is high then, ceteris paribus, the 
price effect of eligibility decisions should be 
more limited and vice versa. Similarly, as 
argued below, the elasticity of supply of 
securities also matters.
In the following, three different approaches to 
quantifying the eligibility premium are 
presented.
(1)  MEASURING THE EFFECT ON SPREADS OF A 
CHANGE IN ELIGIBILITY
For the reasons mentioned above, an ideal 
opportunity to measure the effects of eligibility 
on spreads arises when a small asset category is 
added to a large eligible set. Such a case 
occurred recently in the Eurosystem when, 
on 1 July 2005, selected euro-denominated 
securities from American, Canadian, Japanese 
issuers (non-European Economic Area, non-
EEA, issuers) were added to the list of eligible 
assets (see the ECB press releases of 21 February 
2005 and 30 May 2005). This change should 
have lowered the spreads of these instruments 
relative to comparable assets that were already 
eligible. Therefore, yields of the newly eligible 
assets issued by the non-EEA issuers mentioned 
above are here compared with yields of a sample 
of assets of EEA issuers which had been eligible 
for a long time.
The set of non-EEA bonds was taken from the 
ECB’s Eligible Assets Database on 5 October 
2005. The sample of EEA bonds used for 
benchmarking was selected by taking all the 
corporate and credit bonds issued by EEA 
21  This effect should only be relevant if the asset will effectively 
be used as collateral under the chosen risk control measures and 
handling solutions. If, for instance, the handling solution is 
extremely inconvenient, or if the haircuts applied to the asset are 
extremely high, eligibility may not lead to practical use of the 
asset as collateral and would therefore be hardly relevant. 
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entities. Bonds issued during 2005 were 
removed as well as bonds having a residual 
maturity of less than a year since bonds near 
maturity tend to have a volatile option-adjusted 
spread. A number of bonds with extreme spread 
volatility were also removed. Finally, the EEA 
sample was adjusted to match the relative rating 
distribution of the non-EEA bonds. The rating 
classes are Bloomberg composites, i.e. averages 
or lowest ratings.22 Tables 8 and 9 show 
information on the sample of bonds that were 
used in the analysis.
Chart 3 shows a plot of average daily yield 
spreads in 2005 between non-EEA and EEA 
issuers. The spread is calculated by comparing 
average option-adjusted bid spreads between 
bonds from non-EEA and EEA issuers. The 
use of option-adjusted spreads makes bonds 
with different maturities and optionalities 
comparable. The resulting yield differential is 
quite volatile, ranging between 0.5 and 7.5 basis 
points during the year. The upcoming eligibility 
of bonds from non-EEA issuers was originally 
announced on 21 February, but the eligibility 
date was not yet published at that stage. The 
eligibility date of 1 July was announced in a 
Table 8 Information on the set of bonds used for the analysis
Rating  Number of  Number of   Number of  Number of
  EEA bonds  non-EEA bonds  EEA issuers  non-EEA issuers
AAA 220  18  43  5
AA  348 27 63  8
A 624  50  171  14
TOTAL 1192  95  277  27
Source: ECB Eligible Assets Database.
22  The Bloomberg composite rating (COMP) is a blend of Moody’s 
and S&P ratings. If Moody’s and S&P ratings are split by one 
step, the COMP is equivalent to the lower rating. If Moody’s and 
S&P ratings are split by more than one step, the COMP is 
equivalent to the middle rating.
Table 9 Country distribution of bonds from 
non-EEA issuers





Source: ECB Eligible Assets Database.
Chart 3 One-week moving average spread 
between non-EEA and EEA issuers in 2005
Sources: ECB Eligible Assets Database and Bloomberg.
Note: The spread is calculated by comparing average option-
adjusted bid spreads between bonds from non-EEA and EEA 
issuers (see Table 8). The option-adjusted spread for each 
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non-EEA bonds
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y-axis: one week moving average spread (bps)
second press release on 30 May. Following each 
of these dates the spread seems to be decreasing, 
but, in fact, it had already been doing so prior 
to the announcements. Therefore, it is difficult 
to assign the effects to Eurosystem eligibility. 
Overall, the level of spreads does not seem to 
have changed materially from before the original 
eligibility announcement to the last quarter of 
the year. To identify the possible source of the 
changes, one may note from Table 9 that most 
of the non-EEA bonds are in fact issued by US-
based companies, which suggests that the main 
driving forces behind the evolution of the spread 
are country specific factors. Especially the 23
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major credit events during the second quarter of 
the year, such as problems in the US auto 
industry, can be assumed to have caused the 
widening of the spread during that period. It 
may therefore be concluded that one cannot 
find any evidence of an eligibility premium 
attributed to non-EEA bonds by the decision of 
the Eurosystem to accept them as collateral. 
(2)   SPREAD BETWEEN COLLATERALISED AND 
UNCOLLATERALISED INTERBANK REPO 
OPERATIONS
Another possible indicator for the eligibility 
premium is the spread between interbank 
uncollateralised deposits and repo operations, 
which is normally in the range of 3 to 5 basis 
points for the relevant maturity (see Chart 4). It 
can be argued that a bank can save the spread 
between unsecured and secured borrowing if it 
has eligible collateral. Thus, the spread between 
the two kinds of borrowing corresponds to the 
value of having collateral eligible for interbank 
operations. Of course, this reasoning directly 
holds only for the large majority of banks (in 
the AA and A rating range), which can indeed 
refinance at close to EURIBOR rates. For the 
few worse-rated banks, the eligibility premium 
will be higher. Also, this measurement only 
holds in normal times: in case of liquidity 
stress, the spreads should widen. This is indeed 
what seemed to have happened in 2002, as 
Chart 4 suggests. This was the period in which, 
in particular, the German banking system was 
considered to be under stress, including rumors 
of liquidity problems of individual banks, which 
led to a sort of flight into collateralized 
operations and the spread surpassed 10 basis 
points at the end of 2002 (the spreads have also 
widened more recently in relation to upcoming 
expectations of interest rate increases by the 
ECB). A further caveat is that the set of eligible 
assets for standard interbank repos (“General 
Collateral”23) is a sub-set of the one eligible for 
central bank operations, and central bank and 
interbank repos have some other differences 
impairing the comparison between the two.
(3)   SECURITISATION TO HAVE MORE CENTRAL 
BANK COLLATERAL
Finally, according to anecdotal evidence from the 
euro area, a few banks have securitised assets 
with the sole purpose of making them eligible as 
central bank collateral. Current estimates are 
that such securitisation would have cost them 
around 3 basis points (per annum). The fact that 
this phenomenon has been observed only rarely, 
but that more banks have assets suitable for 
similar securitisation, suggests that other banks 
are not willing to pay the 3 basis points for 
obtaining eligible assets. Again, this indication 
of the eligibility premium is subject to some 
caveats, as not all banks may hold sufficient 
assets suitable for securitisation and since the 
cost of securitisation may be higher for some 
banks. 
The three estimates above consistently indicate 
that the eligibility premium deriving from being 
eligible as collateral for Eurosystem operations 
is, as a maximum, in the order of magnitude of 
a few basis points only. However, again, the 
following caveats to these estimates should be 
highlighted:
Chart 4 Spread between the one-month 
EURIBOR and one-month EUREPO rates since 
the introduction of the EUREPO in March 2002
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23  “General Collateral” according to the EUREPO definition is any 
euro area government debt (see http://www.eurepo.org/eurepo/
eurepogc.html).
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–  In times of financial tensions, the eligibility 
premium will be much higher. One may 
view ample collateral availability as an 
insurance against the consequences of 
financial instability.
–  For lower-rated banks (e.g. banks with a 
BBB rating), the value of the eligibility 
feature is likely to be systematically 
higher.
–  The low eligibility premium in the euro area 
is also the result of the ample availability of 
collateral. If availability were to decrease or 
demand increase, the premium would 
increase as well. 
3.3   EFFECTS ON ISSUANCE
The preceding analysis has maintained as 
simplifying assumption that the amounts of 
securities of different types are given. However, 
issuance activity should react to yield effects of 
eligibility decisions. First, there may be a 
substitution effect and debtors will seek to 
fund themselves in the cheapest way; thus, 
eligible instruments substitute, over time, 
ineligible instruments. Second, agents may 
decide to issue, in the aggregate, more debt 
since the lower the financing costs, the greater 
the willingness to issue debt should be. While 
the substitution effect could, at least in theory, 
be significant even for an eligibility premium 
of only a few basis points, the second effect 
would require more substantial changes in 
yields to be relevant. Here, it suffices to note 
that the assumption (maintained so far) of a 
zero elasticity of issuance to yield changes 
caused by eligibility decisions biases any 
estimate of the eligibility premium to the 
upside, particularly in the long term. In the 
extreme case of infinite elasticity the only 
consequence of a changing eligibility premium 
would be on the amounts issued, not on yields. 
3.4   COLLATERAL FOR CENTRAL BANK 
OPERATIONS AND FOR INTERBANK REPO 
MARKETS
A last remark can shed light on the specific 
eligibility premium that derives from the fact 
that some assets are only eligible for central 
bank operations and not for operations in the 
private repo markets. For this purpose, it is 
interesting to jointly consider, on the one hand, 
the difference between the collateral accepted 
in the euro area for standard interbank operations 
(so-called General Collateral, or GC) and that 
eligible for Eurosystem operations and, on the 
other hand, the relationship between the rates of 
interest prevailing on the Eurosystem and on 
the GC market operations. 
As regards the first point, while GC essentially 
includes all central government bonds of the 
euro area, and partially Jumbo Pfandbriefe (e.g. 
for Eurex repos), Eurosystem collateral is, as 
seen above, much wider, including many other 
fixed income private instruments and some 
non-marketable claims. In four countries, bank 
loans to corporations are also eligible and these 
will become eligible in the entire euro area 
starting in 2007. 
With regard to the relationship between the 
interest rates prevailing on the two types of 
operations, the striking fact is that they are so 
close, both in level and in behaviour. 
In particular for short-term Eurosystem main 
refinancing operations (MROs), Bindseil et al. 
(2004) calculate, for the one-year period starting 
in June 2000, the average spread between 
weighted average rates on these operations and, 
inter alia, repo rates. They note (on page 14) 
that the former are, on average, marginally 
lower (0.487 basis point) than the latter. This is 
surprising since, as stated earlier, the set of 
collateral eligible for interbank operations is 
smaller than the one for central bank operations. 
The result of a very close relationship between 
the two types of rates is confirmed by more 
recent observations, as illustrated by the 
following chart comparing the one week 25
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EUREPO rate with the weighted average MRO 
tender rate. EUREPO rates tend to exceed MRO 
rates by mostly one or two basis points, also 
reflecting that EUREPO rates are offered rates, 
with a typical spread in the repo market of 
around 1-3 basis points. 
One can interpret this result as meaning that the 
relevance of “collateral arbitrage”, i.e. using 
for central bank operations the assets not 
eligible for interbank operations, is relatively 
limited, otherwise competitive pressure should 
induce banks to offer higher rates to get liquidity 
from the Eurosystem rather than in the GC 
market. However, it should also be recalled, as 
noted above, that there is a tendency to use 
over-proportionally less liquid, but highly rated, 
private paper, such as bank bonds and ABSs, 
in the Eurosystem operations. Furthermore, 
Bindseil et al. (2004) have argued that the 
specific characteristics of Eurosystem MROs 
lead to “bid shading”, i.e. to lower bid rates 
relative to the case of certainty about allotment 
results, and thus that the impact on rates from 
differences in the collateral sets may actually be 
relevant, but neutralised by an independent 
opposite effect. 
Interestingly, the relationship between the rates 
prevailing in the Eurosystem’s three-month 
longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), 
which have been studied by Linzert et al. (2004), 
and those determined in three months private 
repo operations, such as reflected in EUREPO,   
Chart 5 Spread between the one week 
EUREPO rate and the weighted average MRO 
rate 
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is rather different from that prevailing for 
MROs. On average, the weighted average rate 
of LTROs was 3 basis points above the 
corresponding EUREPO rate in the period from 
March 2002 to October 2004 (see Chart 6), with 
some notably higher values. If bid shading is 
weaker in LTROs, it could be concluded that 
this spread, which is small but not insignificant, 
is a better measure of the effect deriving from 
the difference between the two sets of 
collateral.24
Whatever conclusion is reached about this 
complex issue, there may be good reasons why 
a central bank should accept a wider range of 
collateral than private market participants:
–  Central bank collateral serves monetary 
policy implementation and payment systems, 
the smooth functioning of which is socially 
valuable. While in the interbank market 
uncollateralised operations are always an 
alternative, central banks need, for the 
reasons spelled out in the introduction, to 
stick to collateralisation. A scarcity of 
collateral, even if temporary, could have 
very negative consequences and needs to be 
avoided, even at the price of having “too 
much” collateral in normal times.
–  As a consequence of the size of central bank 
operations, it may be efficient to set up 
Chart 6 Spread between the three-month 
LTRO and the three months EUREPO rate
(weighted average LTRO rate minus 3 months EUREPO rate, 
in basis points)
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24  See also Ewerhart et al. (2005) for an analysis of the relevance 
of collateral for bidding behaviour in central bank operations.
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specific handling, credit assessment or risk 
mitigation structures which would be more 
difficult to set up in the context of interbank 
operations.
–  Finally, there is no guarantee that the market 
establishes efficient collateralisation 
conventions, since the establishment of 
these conventions involves network 
externalities (see e.g. Katz and Shapiro 
(1985) for a general presentation of network 
externality issues). Thus, the central bank, 
as a large public player, could positively 
influence market conventions. For instance, 
trade bills became the dominant financial 
instrument in the interbank market in the 
18th, 19th and early 20th century in the 
United Kingdom and parts of Europe (see 
e.g. King (1936), Reichsbank (1910)) 
because central banks accepted them for 
discounting.
4 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a simplified, logical 
framework for establishing a central bank 
collateral system and provided some applications 
relating to the case of the Eurosystem. A 
collateral framework should ensure that the risk 
taken in refinancing operations is in line with a 
central bank’s risk tolerance. This implies that 
if the central bank accepts different types of 
collateral, it should apply differentiated risk 
mitigation measures to ensure that the risk 
remaining after the application of these 
measures complies with its risk tolerance, 
whatever asset from the list of eligible collateral 
is used. Once the necessary risk mitigation 
measures have been defined for each type of 
asset, the central bank can rank the asset 
categories according to their cost and then set a 
cut-off point in accordance with the demand for 
collateral. 
The paper stresses, however, that the collateral 
framework needs to strike a balance between 
precision and simplicity and that therefore any 
existing framework is to be seen as an 
approximation to a theoretically optimal 
design. Therefore, its actual features have to 
be periodically reviewed and, if necessary, 
modified, in the light of experience (i.e. in 
particular in the light of the actual use of the 
different types of collateral) and resulting 
concentration risks. Another fundamental 
component of this review and adaptation process 
are the criticisms and suggestions from analysts 
and market participants. 
If the collateral framework and associated risk 
mitigation measures follow the above-outlined 
methodology, one should not speak of its 
possible distortion effect on asset prices. There 
may well be an impact, but not a distortion, 
given that the central bank has properly 
optimised its collateral framework. Still, it is 
interesting to assess the effects of the collateral 
framework on the prices of eligible assets, in 
particular to get an idea of the size of the 
“eligibility premium”, i.e. of the spreads, ceteris 
paribus, between eligible and ineligible assets. 
While the eligibility premium is likely to change 
over time, in the case of the euro area the broad 
range and large amount of eligible collateral are 
likely to limit it. Some empirical measures, the 
limitations of which need to be stressed, 
consistently indicate an average level of the 
eligibility premium of only a few basis points. 
However, this premium will of course be 
different for different assets and possibly also 
for different counterparties. In addition, it could 
rise with an increase in the demand for collateral, 
particularly if there were to be a financial crisis, 
or if the supply of available collateral were to 
shrink. 
Overall, the criticism that the collateral 
framework of the Eurosystem biases downwards 
the yield differentials between securities issued 
by governments with different ratings finds 
very little support in the analysis carried out in 
this paper.27
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ANNEX
SEGREGATION OF CENTRAL BANK OPERATIONS 
ACCORDING TO COLLATERAL TYPE VERSUS 
POOLING
One decision that arises, both for central banks 
and interbank markets, is whether to segregate 
operations according to the type of collateral or 
to pool different types of collateral.25 Both 
approaches are applied by central banks. The 
classical Lombard lending by central banks in 
the late 19th century allowed for the pooling of 
the most diverse sorts of collateral (see e.g. 
Reichsbank (1910)). Today, the Eurosystem and 
the Bank of England have adopted a pooling 
approach for their temporary operations. The 
Fed, by contrast, segregates its open market 
operations, but allows for pooling in its 
(quantitatively far less relevant) primary 
facility. Also the Bank of Japan segregates to 
some extent its open market operations, while 
the Banque de France did so prior to 1999.
In the case of segregation, there is an obvious 
need to ensure consistency between the tender 
results obtained in operations with different 
types of collateral. Alternative approaches to 
this issue can be conceived, depending on which 
tender procedure is applied. If the temporary 
operations are conducted as fixed rate tenders, 
the central bank first has to decide whether to 
set the same tender rate for the different 
tranches. Alternatively, it could set a market-
derived spread, if relevant and observable. It 
also has to decide how to split up its intended 
tender amount, and what to pre-announce. It 
could, for instance, pre-announce that it would 
allocate 70% to a government security repo 
tender and 30% to a corporate bond/ABS repo 
tender. The split could be based on market 
capitalisation or on a view of credit risks. 
Alternatively, the central bank could announce 
that the split would be proportional to the 
respective bids. 
If the temporary operations are conducted as 
variable rate tenders, again various options 
exist. First, the central bank could, before 
receiving the bids, announce the overall 
allotment amount and its split. Then, the 
marginal rates, possibly different on the 
different tranches, will result from bidding 
which is transparent and market-oriented. 
However, obviously the resulting spread would 
also depend on the split of allotment amounts 
and the spreads therefore cannot be seen as a 
pure market outcome. As a practical example, 
in its segregated operations, the Fed aims to 
achieve a level of spreads on the different 
auctions which is consistent with that prevailing 
on the private repo market. Alternatively, and 
less desirably, the central bank may maintain 
full discretion and decide the allotment on the 
basis of various considerations after receiving 
the bids. 
How can the central bank decide between a 
pooling and a segregated approach? Focusing 
on risk management and efficiency 
considerations, a pooling system has the general 
advantage of simplicity and efficiency, both for 
the central bank and for its counterparties. The 
segregated approach, instead, has the advantage 
of reducing the possible impact of central bank 
operations on spreads (“market neutrality”). In 
principle, segregation also allows better control 
of the amounts of the different collateral types 
received (quantity effect) and the achievement 
of rates on the temporary operations which are 
more in line with those prevailing in private 
repo operations (price effect). By segregating 
the operations and by setting an appropriate 
split between the tranches,26 concentration risk 
resulting from disproportionate use of some 
asset category can be addressed directly, as well 
as the risk of generating interest rates out of 
line with market rates. The relevance of this 
argument obviously depends on whether indeed 
undesired concentration would arise without 
tranching. This can be seen in practice when 
monitoring the collateral framework, in 
particular whether banks use in a disproportionate 
25  An example of a pooling solution in the interbank market is the 
Xemac service offered by Clearstream.
26  Alternatively, this could also be achieved in fixed rate tenders 
with tranches whose relative size is driven by the relative size 
of bids, but with a pre-announced spread that makes the tranche 
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27  The Federal Reserve System (2002, pp. 3-37) also addresses this 
issue: “An additional option would be to conduct separate 
auctions for different pools (or tranches) of collateral. For 
example, the Federal Reserve could restrict eligible collateral in 
one subset of an auction to the more-liquid or more-marketable 
types of collateral eligible for discount window borrowing and 
hold a separate auction for less-liquid or non-marketable types 
of eligible collateral. Indeed, tranches for each auction could be 
delineated even more finely for various categories of collateral, 
yielding a large number of separate sub-auctions within the 
auction framework. Holding separate auctions for different 
tranches of collateral could increase the Federal Reserve’s 
operational costs of implementing the auction credit facility. 
And holding auctions for narrower collateral pools might 
increase the likelihood that supply constraints for collateral 
would restrict the feasible size of any auction. There is also 
some risk that auctions based on narrow categories of collateral 
could be misinterpreted as a form of credit allocation. In the 
absence of separate auctions based on different tranches of 
collateral, banks would probably submit their less-liquid and 
less-marketable assets as collateral to the Federal Reserve. As 
long as banks have an abundance of collateral that could be used 
to secure advances from the auction credit facility, however, 
they would probably post as collateral those less-liquid or less-
marketable assets that are operationally easiest for them to 
deliver. If they are not set appropriately, the differential haircuts 
the Federal Reserve applies to different types of assets might 
influence the types of collateral pledged.”
way some assets. While some disproportionate 
use will always occur, the question is whether 
this justifies additional complexity to address 
it. 
If, contrary to what was assumed in this paper, 
risk mitigation measures cannot equalize the 
residual risk of different collateral types, then a 
higher interest rate could be an appropriate 
compensation for operations secured by more 
risky collateral, which would argue in favor of 
segregation. However, such a view may blur the 
fundamental distinction between monetary 
policy implementation, which is not profit-
oriented, and investment operations, which 
are. 
In conclusion, the issue of pooling versus 
tranching is a difficult one, which certainly 
deserves further research.2729
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